THE US Department of Justice has filed a $103m claim against the owner and technical manager of the containership Dali (IMO: 9697428) for losses and damages resulting from the ship’s catastrophic allision with Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge on March 26.

The sum covers costs of $74m for the US Army Corps of Engineers, $22m for the Coast Guard, $3.5m for the Department of Labor, $1.8m for the US Navy, and $853,916 for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The US government is just one of numerous claimants in the Limitation of Liability Act case of Dali owner Grace Ocean and technical manager Synergy, which are seeking to cap their liability at $43.7m, the value of the vessel.

The remainder of claims will be filed by September 24, with the families of the six workers killed in the bridge collapse expected to do so shortly.

The DOJ claim filed on Wednesday offered new details on the casualty and alleged that the bridge disaster was the result of negligence on the part of Grace Ocean and Synergy. “This tragedy was entirely avoidable,” maintained the DOJ.

“Petitioners’ liability to the United States extends beyond the value of Dali because of the fault, recklessness, negligence, and lack of due care of those responsible for the vessel, and the unseaworthiness of the vessel.”

Asked for a response to the new allegations raised by the DOJ, a spokesperson for Grace Ocean and Synergy told Lloyd’s List, “The owner and manager will have no further comment on the merits of any claim at this time, but we do look forward to our day in court to set the record straight.”

Alleged negligence prior to Baltimore departure

According to the DOJ, the ship’s “transformer and breakers had long suffered the effects of heavy vibrations, a well-known cause of transformer and electrical failure. Instead of taking steps to eliminate the cause of excessive vibrations, petitioners jerry-rigged their ship.

“They retrofitted the transformer with anti-vibration braces, one of which had cracked over time, had been repaired with welds, and had cracked again.” The braces were welded to the bulkhead walls on one side, and “crudely bolted to the tops of the transformer via a steel bracket” on the other.

“They also wedged a metal cargo hook between the transformer and a nearby steel beam in a makeshift attempt to limit the vibration. This was jerry-rigged, in a literal sense, from spare cargo equipment.”

“The Dali’s vibration problems were documented, well known, and of concern to the crew,” said the DOJ. In handover notes dated May 23, 2023, the prior captain noted engine restrictions due to “heavy vibration” and wrote: “In past, same informed to Synergy”.

The handover notes also warned that the ship vibrated so much that container lashings were loosened. The Dali was providing container services for Maersk at the time of the casualty. “Lashing checks [need] to be done on daily basis. The aft bays are subject to constant vibration and have noticed lashing tending to slack quickly,” read the handover notes.

During recent inspections, Dali “was found to have loose bolts, nuts and washers and broken electrical cable ties inside the transformer and switchboards,” said the DOJ. “The ship’s electrical equipment was in such poor condition that an independent testing agency discontinued further testing due to safety concerns.”

Prior to the ship’s arrival in Baltimore, “excessive vibration had loosened electrical connections in circuitry that was necessary to keep the circuit breakers for the transformer from tripping”.

The DOJ said Dali lost power on March 25 while at the Baltimore berth, but the ship failed to notify the US Coast Guard of the outage, as was required.

Alleged negligence fallout after Baltimore departure

After departing on March 26, the captain did not disclose “prior losses of power or electrical defects or abnormalities to the Maryland pilot or apprentice pilot”, said the DOJ.

Furthermore, the vessel’s transformer was set in “manual” and not “automatic” mode. The DOJ called this an “inexplicable failure”.

The circuit breaker on the transformer tripped at 1:25am, causing the first blackout. “Had the transformer been in the automatic control mode, the circuit breakers for the transformer would have closed automatically after only a few seconds, restoring lighting, steering, and propulsion.”

Instead, it took a minute for engineers to manually restore power (although not to the main engine or propeller). Then, 65 seconds later, the ship lost power again.

According to the DOJ, the Dali was using a “flushing pump” to supply fuel to the number 3 and 4 auxiliary engines, not supply and booster fuel pumps.

“While improper, this was not unusual for the Dali. It had been petitioners’ longstanding custom and practice to use the flushing pump to supply fuel to the number 3 and number 4 auxiliary engines.

“Petitioners chose to use the flushing pump, instead of the proper supply and booster pumps, as a matter of economy and convenience. This configuration reduced overall maintenance costs on the number 3 and number 4 auxiliary engines and reduced vessel delays when switching between heavy and lighter fuel oils upon entering emissions control areas of the US. In short, using the flushing pump saved money.

“Had the Dali used the proper supply and booster pumps to supply fuel to the diesel generators, these pumps would have restarted automatically [after the first blackout] and the second power outage never would have occurred.

“The flushing pump cannot restart automatically,” the DOJ continued. Instead, as a backup, the number 3 and 4 auxiliary engines received fuel from a pneumatic pump, “but this small pump was never intended for such a task and could not provide enough fuel pressure to keep two diesel generators (i.e., the auxiliary engines and their two paired electrical generators) running while carrying an electrical load”.

“Short on fuel, these engines began to slow and lose power”, and as a result, the ship’s computers took them offline by opening the circuit breaker between the auxiliary engines and the switchboard, causing the second blackout.

Auxiliary engine 2 did come back online, bringing shipboard power on again, yet the main engines never restarted, the bow thruster was “inexplicably unavailable” – and 90 seconds after the lights came back on for the second time, Dali rammed the bridge.

“Because of the unseaworthy condition of the ship, none of the four means available to help control Dali – her propeller, rudder, anchor or bow thruster – worked when they were needed to avert or even mitigate this disaster,” asserted to the DOJ.