Libya’s lucrative fuel smuggling operations sustained by small tanker network
A Lloyd’s List investigation quantifies for the first time the minimum number of calls to Benghazi’s old harbour, a notorious hub for illicit fuel exports
Black market fuel trade contributes to Libya’s state of crisis, but there are also questions about what the profits of this illicit trade are ultimately financing
FUEL smuggling out of Libya is a billion-dollar business, but little is known about the scale of the maritime operation that routinely ferries refined petroleum products out of Libya.
A Lloyd’s List investigation has identified 42 tankers over the past two years that have made at least 195 journeys to Benghazi’s old harbour, equating to 1.4m dwt.
Satellite imagery reviewed by Lloyd’s List during the course of this investigation shows a regular turnover of vessels, including larger tankers, at the old harbour. This suggests the true number of calls is even greater and the tanker network is larger than what is estimated because there are vessels operating outside of the normal deceptive patterns that make them even more difficult to trace.
Benghazi’s old harbour on paper
The exploitation of gasoil in Libya has been a problem for more than a decade, with smugglers taking advantage of the government’s fuel subsidy programme to sell the fuel on the black market for profit.
The export of gasoil is considered illegal when not authorised by Libya’s National Oil Corporation. The state-run group has emphasised to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya that no exports are undertaken.
A year-long Bloomberg investigation found that in 2022 as much as 40% of the fuel refined domestically and being imported into the country under the subsidy programme — about $5bn a year — is being diverted into illicit trade.
Benghazi has emerged a hotspot for seaborne smuggling over the past several years.
Benghazi is a key commercial port located in east Libya, and in the northernmost part of Benghazi port on the eastern side is the old harbour (marked in the graphic below).
According to the UN panel, the old harbour was previously used for the export of scrap metal.
However, in March 2022 vessels began arriving to be loaded with fuel from tanker trucks, and it has since evolved into a bustling illicit fuel export hub.
An analysis of Automatic Identification System data transmitted within Benghazi’s old harbour in 2021 reveals one traceable arrival of a product tanker in September that year.
A traceable arrival is defined as a port call where AIS is enabled.
General cargoships made up most traceable calls recorded in 2021, accounting for 126 of 142 arrivals, but this activity began winding down in March 2022.
In April of that year, it started to become more common for product tankers to show up in Benghazi’s old harbour, with about one tanker each month being picked up by vessel tracking data.
This data in no way reflects the true scale of callings as the vast majority are done under the guise of AIS gaps, but it does reinforce the fact that scrap exports were phased out in favour of oil exports.
In 2022 and 2023 some 10 and nine traceable product calls took place, but this year the smuggling activity has moved almost entirely offline with only two arrivals being picked up from January to August with AIS data.
“Zawiya used to be the biggest hub for maritime fuel smuggling,” explains David Soud, head of research and analysis at IR Consilium.
“When the EU launched Operation Sophia and then Operation Irini to clamp down on illicit flows linked with Libya, and also incentivised some Libyan militia groups to counter those flows rather than exploit them, fuel smuggling out of the western Libyan coast slowed.”
Lower fuel volumes out of western Libya may have created the opportunity for more smuggling in eastern Libya.
This may also have served the purposes of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, who, since their failure to subdue Tripoli in 2020, have been looking to consolidate control and form alliances in parts of eastern and southern Libya, Soud added.
The Government of National Unity is the government recognised by the UN in Libya.
The LAAF, led by Khalifa Haftar, consists of both former Gaddafi-era armed forces and informal militias and considers itself to be the national army, but this is contested by the internationally recognised government.
The LAAF is likely able to extract more funds from illicit smuggling moving east.
“The LAAF dominates society in eastern Libya,” explains senior research analyst at Janes, James Trigg.
“The understanding is that any activity occurring in eastern Libya likely has the (tacit) permission of the Haftar family and LAAF chain of command.”
The UN panel confirmed in its 2023 report that maritime fuel smuggling from the areas around Zawiyah and Zuwarah in western Libya continues.
Of the activity reviewed by Lloyd’s List, only three voyages were identified which were consistent with possible dark activity linked to west Libya, all of which took place in 2023.
Patterns of the seaborne fuel smuggling network
The panel identified three modi operandi used by the fuel smuggling networks:
- Ships load in Benghazi then sail to international waters, particularly east of Malta, where they offload the cargo through ship-to-ship transfers
- Vessels load in Benghazi then sail direct to their next destination and discharge using falsified export certificates
- Ships load in one country but below capacity then stop in Benghazi where they are loaded either to capacity or overcapacity. The vessel then proceeds to the next port of call
Lloyd’s List identified* 42 tankers which undertook journeys consistent with the methods described by the panel between January 2023 and August 2024. This accounts for both traceable and “dark” arrivals.
Together, these ships made at least 195 calls, equating to about 1.4m dwt, to Benghazi’s old harbour during the period studied.
The true number of calls is higher than this as there are instances where members of the smuggling ring are offline for several weeks and even months at a time, during which multiple voyages would have been possible.
Further, satellite imagery shows the regular presence of much larger ships which does not completely align with the network identified by Lloyd’s List.
This suggests there are vessels that are operating outside of the so-called “normal” deceptive shipping practices employed to call at Benghazi and are much more difficult to track as a result.
There were 673 traceable non-domestic arrivals of cargo-carrying vessels across the entire Benghazi port from January 2023 to August 2024, measuring 14m dwt.
Most of the calls to Benghazi’s old harbour are done during gaps in AIS transmission, which are also known as “dark” port calls.
The 2,684 dwt Georgia G (IMO: 9119464) and 1,056 dwt Mardi (IMO: 8853673) are two examples that exhibit the typical route taken by those involved in the fuel smuggling ring.
Georgia G, under its previous name of Ses 1 and under different owners, departed Sfax, Tunisia on February 2, 2024 heading east.
Georgia G disables its AIS while sailing in the Mediterranean Sea from February 4 to 12, during which time the vessel calls to Benghazi’s old harbour.
Although a manual input, draught information obtained through AIS data shows an increase from 4.5 to 5.5, suggesting the vessel loaded cargo during the period it was offline.
Georgia G sails for Egypt’s Port Said Roads anchorage where it conducts a ship-to-ship transfer with the sanctioned and Lloyd’s List dark fleet** member Auga (IMO: 9381732) on February 19.
As Ses 1 the vessel made four journeys consistent with the patterns that fit the fuel smuggling network.
The vessel was acquired from Sea Eagle Navigation SA, a Marshall Islands registered company, in May 2024 and has not been engaged in this trade since.
Cameroon-flagged Mardi ran a regular route from Benghazi to the STS area off Malta for over a year.
Since January 2023 it completed 16 voyages which track with the Panel’s pattern. Lloyd’s List has been able to identify the ship on two occasions using high resolution satellite imagery.
The example below is from July 2024 when Mardi is offline for just over two weeks. The satellite images show a vessel with the exact dimensions as Mardi, with markings that match, during two separate voyages when the vessel is not transmitting AIS.
Disabling AIS data is the most common deceptive shipping practice used by those ferrying refined products out of Libya, but last year a vessel called at Benghazi old harbour while spoofing its location via AIS.
Juliet (IMO: 9140853) a 9,359 dwt Comoros-flagged product tanker, was identified by the panel for calling to the illicit export hub on January 31, 2023.
The vessel was named Jessica at the time but renamed to Juliet in March 2023.
Juliet often stops transmitting AIS in the Mediterranean Sea off Libya on the approach to Benghazi and reappears in a similar location.
On a seemingly normal voyage in August 2023 instead of going dark the ship spoofed its location while at Benghazi old harbour. Juliet also spoofed its location at its next port of call, where it was likely discharging the cargo loaded in Libya.
It is difficult to track the end destinations of the cargo loaded at Benghazi old harbour, especially when the products are transported onto other vessels through STS transfers.
Lloyd’s List was able to track some shipments to ports in Türkiye and Somalia, and behaviour suggests there are countries in the east Mediterranean that receive regular deliveries, likely Syria or Lebanon, but this is difficult to confirm as the ships call with their AIS disabled.
Most of the product tankers engaged in this trade are very small, with 30 ships under 10,000 dwt.
There were five handy tankers, and seven vessels which either fell into the MR1 or MR2 category.
The average age of the fleet is 29.5 years old and flags that are notorious for providing little oversight, such as Cameroon and Comoros, are common.
Ships operating in the fuel smuggling network are at risk of being seized because of the illicit nature of the business.
Cameroon-flagged 2,415 dwt product tanker Queen Majeda (IMO: 9117806) was detained twice in 2022 after having made several voyages to Benghazi.
It was ultimately seized in Durres, Albania in September 2022 while attempting to sell the cargo it loaded in Benghazi, according to the panel.
Fuel smuggling sustaining a state in crisis
Libya is a country that is plagued by political, economic and security problems, and illicit exports on the black market only support and exacerbate these issues.
“Fuel smuggling might sound like a low priority among Libya’s litany of problems, yet its ongoing occurrence underpins and enables so many of Libya’s other crises,” said Trigg.
“From the political deadlock between the country’s two rival political administrations, to the continued risk of a return to civil war, to the struggles of successive Libyan governments to capitalise on the country’s natural resources and hydrocarbon export revenues, thereby hindering Libya’s socio-economic reconstruction.”
Another significant concern is what the profits from illicit exports are being used for.
“Fuel smuggling, which has included laundering it into legitimate markets in Europe, is part of an illicit economy linked in complicated ways to migrant smuggling, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, the war in Sudan, instability in the Sahel — it shouldn't be viewed in isolation,” said Soud.
“We ignore it at our peril in a sense because we have to ask where the money is going and what the profits are financing.”
It is Libya’s own citizens that suffer the most from the illicit trade.
In September 2023 a mayor in Libya’s southern region said the price of fuel was over 300% more than the official price in Libya.
The heightened prices were blamed on the failure of Libyan governments to prioritise sufficient supplies of fuel and the interception of supplies by smugglers.
“While domestic demand continues to outstrip supply, Libyans are forced to take drastic action to secure the fuel they need,” explains Trigg. “In August 2022 a fuel tanker overturned and caught fire. The subsequent explosion led to the deaths of 22 people and dozens of further injuries among those who had sought to siphon fuel from the truck.”
* Lloyd’s List extracted AIS gaps that opened and closed within a polygon encompassing all of Libya’s coastline as well as part of Egypt’s up to Malta and the island of Crete. Gaps were reviewed and those consistent with the pattern identified by the UN panel were counted as likely voyages to Benghazi old harbour. Instances where a vessel could not reach Benghazi in the time it was offline as well as vessels inconsistent with the smuggling profile were removed. Only product and bunkering tankers were considered. Traceable calls were identified using AIS data.
** Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if it is aged 15 years or over, anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery, solely deployed in sanctioned oil trades, and engaged in one or more of the deceptive shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in May 2020. The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled shipping entities such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, or Iran’s National Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.
Download our explainer on the different risk profiles of the dark fleet here
