A NORTH Korean-owned product tanker designated by the UN was tracked calling in Russia this earlier this month, which is part of a new trend where North Korean-affiliated vessels are increasingly engaging in this trade in plain sight. 

It is a striking departure from what is an almost exclusively “dark” trade and is interpreted as a sign of not only the growing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, but the normalisation of this relationship.

The government-owned, 3,565 dwt North Korea-flagged Chon Ma San (IMO: 8660313) arrived to Vostochnyy port on October 19, according to Automatic Identification System data.

This is different from its previous voyages to Russia where the vessel has always gone “dark” (where its AIS is disabled). 

The deliberate disabling of AIS is considered a deceptive shipping practice, and in the past it is likely that those on board Chon Ma San disabled the ship’s AIS transmissions to obfuscate movements and evade detection.

A study published by UK think tank Royal United Services Institute named Chon Ma San as one of five North Korean tankers that berthed at the oil bunkering facility in Vostochnyy in March this year. 

The image below shows Chon Ma San’s AIS trace during a previous call to Vostochnyy compared with its most recent voyage.

Chon Ma San does disable its AIS a couple days later while at Vostochnyy, hiding the exact location of its berth.

The vessel is now sailing north through the Yellow Sea, signalling Nampo as its destination.

Nampo is one of North Korea’s main sites for offloading oil. 

Ships transporting goods between North Korea and Russia almost always disable AIS either for entire voyages or significant parts of the voyages, making it difficult to track these shipments with traditional vessel-tracking data. 

For this reason, most of what is known of the burgeoning maritime trade between the two countries is through analysis of satellite imagery, with AIS data playing a more secondary role. 

Increasingly though, North Korea’s fleet is opting to continue transmitting AIS while at Russian ports and anchorages, allowing calls to be generated and recorded. 

The first time an arrival of a North Korea-affiliated vessel was captured with vessel-tracking data since 2021 was when the 1991-built 6,843 dwt government-owned general cargoship Kum Ya (IMO: 9004073) called to Nakhodka in June 2023. 

Kum Ya has made another four calls to Vanino, Vladivostok anchorage and Nakhodka anchorage, all located in Russia’s far east, during 2024.  

“Not hiding activity is a classic part of Russia’s playbook,” explains Bosphorus Observer geopolitical consultant Yörük Işik.

“This move is designed to legitimise relations with North Korea and show the world that Russia is not a spent force, that they’re capable of building new friendships and strategic relationships.” 

Since the end of September another three North Korea-affiliated ships, those either flagged or with an owner headquartered in North Korea, have been tracked calling to Russia. 

These are North Korea-flagged general cargoships Jinmobong 4 (IMO: 1070911) and Ja Ryok (IMO: 9826952), as well as Chon Ma San.

The difference between Chon Ma San and the others, aside from vessel type, is that Chon Ma San is designated under a UN Security Council sanctions regime. 

Chon Ma San was added to the UN’s 1718 designated vessels list in March 2018 for its involvement in a ship-to-ship transfer of oil in November 2017. 

Member states are meant to deny Chon Ma San port entry. 

Russia’s blatant admittance of Chon Ma San to Vostochnyy comes after Moscow blocked the renewal of the UN Security Council panel of experts monitoring enforcement against North Korea in April this year. 

The US, alongside Japan, South Korea and eight other countries, has responded to the disbanding of the panel of experts by announcing the upcoming establishment of a multilateral mechanism to monitor sanctions breaches. 

The US has repeatedly warned about deepening ties between Moscow and Pyongyang and has accused the latter of supplying munitions and materiel to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

Investigations indicate that Russia is exporting refined petroleum in return. North Korean imports of refined petroleum are capped by the UN Security Council to 500,000 barrels a year and should Russia help exceed this volume it would amount to a breach of international sanctions. 

The changing diplomatic dynamic between Russia and North Korea means that North Korea’s strategic position has evolved over the past few years.

“North Korea is no longer completely isolated but part of a growing alliance between Russia, Iran and China; this also includes the alternative financial architecture these members are pursuing,” said Dragonfly Intelligence associate director Barbara Kelemen.

“And although this alliance is not monolithic and has its own limitations, it enables North Korea to address its import needs — such as technology and energy — in exchange for providing military capabilities.”

North Korea would increasingly rely on these partners to become more independent and would subsequently deprioritise efforts to alleviate sanctions through engagement with the US, she added.