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Spoofing tanker completes Russia cargo STS with sanctions-linked suezmaxes

Two tankers were formerly managed by UK-sanctioned K&O Shipmanagment and changed ISM managers to circumvent designations

Urals cargoes were transferred to Cameroon-flagged Atila while its AIS signals broadcast improbable speed and course over ground — an indication that the very large crude carrier was spoofing its location, a deceptive shipping practice to disguise its real location and activity

A VERY large crude carrier laden with Urals crude is sailing for Asia after transferring cargoes from two sanctions-linked suezmax tankers in international waters off Morocco earlier this month, while spoofing its location to obfuscate the activity.

The Cameroon-flagged VLCC Atila (IMO: 9262754), part of the so-called *‘dark fleet’ shipping sanctioned Russian, Venezuelan and Iranian oil, undertook the transfers with Sakarya (IMO: 9524463) and Cankiri (IMO: 9411331), which had earlier loaded cargoes from the Baltic port of Primorsk in late October, vessel-tracking data show.

Both suezmax tankers were formerly managed by UK-sanctioned K&O Shipmanagement and changed ISM managers to circumvent the designations shortly afterwards.

 

 

 

Vessel tracking showed that Atila’s course and speed over ground for periods between November 6-11 were showing patterns that did not reflect real-time sailing conditions, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence data.

 

These were the dates when the ship-to-ship transfers occurred, according to analysis of commodities tracking data supplied by Vortexa.

The unusual AIS signals were an indication the tanker was spoofing its location, which involves manipulating data transmission to appear in one place while being elsewhere.

This is one of the few Urals cargoes recently seen transferred from the Ceuta area, which was popular in 2023 and 2022 for consolidating China-bound Russian crude to larger VLCCs from smaller tankers that had loaded at Arctic, Black and Baltic seas ports.

Atila, whose ownership is unknown, has a single-ship brass plate registered owner in the Seychelles, Grat Shipping, with the single-ship ISM manager Kazakhstan-based Meridian Navi Shipmanagement, according to Equasis.

 

 

Both Sakarya and Cankiri are also part of the so-called dark fleet.

2001-built, Panama flagged Sakarya and Cankiri’s registered owners are Hong Kong-based Prominent Shipmanagement, whose fleet of managed tankers includes a further nine that are also used to transport sanctioned crude and are part of the dark fleet.

The vessels were formerly managed by K&O Shipmanagement until June 2023, when the company was sanctioned by the UK government.

The tanker’s ultimate destination is now being broadcast. It is now sailing along the west coast of Africa and likely around the Cape of Good Hope for China, which is one of the top three buyers of Russian oil, alongside Türkiye and India.

 

* Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if it is aged 15 years or over, anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery, solely deployed in sanctioned oil trades, and engaged in one or more of the deceptive shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in May 2020. The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled shipping entities such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, or Iran’s National Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.

Download our explainer on the different risk profiles of the dark fleet here

 

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