AN ELABORATE scheme to skirt US sanctions on Iranian shipments of energy products is laid bare in a haul of leaked documents, showcasing the process through which owners, shippers and other supply chain actors sidestep Washington’s prohibitions.

An analysis of dozens of leaked emails and documents uploaded by dissident website WikiIran shows the steps behind a shipment of Iran-origin liquified petroleum gas in spring 2023. The emails, which include instructions on manipulating a vessel’s tracking signals and the use of forged shipping documents to obfuscate the cargo’s origin, also showcase the worrying substandard safety practices of shipowners involved in sanctions trades.

Emails sent to two of the primary individuals involved in the voyage were not deliverable, suggesting accounts exposed in the leaks have since been shut. As such, Lloyd’s List has not been able to independently verify the source and authenticity of the emails and documents, although much of their contents can be corroborated with Automatic Identification System data and satellite imagery.

The leaked communications tell the story of the 1991-built, Cameroon-flagged very large gas carrier Sea Opera (IMO: 9000883).

The documents suggest the vessel was owned or operated at the time by US-sanctioned Triliance Petrochemical, which chartered it to the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Commercial Company, also a US-sanctioned company, and the trading arm of the Iranian petrochemical conglomerate Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company.

The VLGC was on its way back to the Middle East Gulf from China in early April 2023, and arrived at Khor Fakkan anchorage, where it was slated to bunker, around April 9.

According to the leaked emails, Sea Opera was slated to sail to Assaluyeh, Iran, to load an LPG cargo after it had finished bunkering. The cargo would then be offloaded via a ship-to-ship transfer to the Panama-flagged, 2000-built VLGC Pawan Putra (IMO: 9195494), codenamed in some of the leaked emails as “P67”, in Khalid port in the United Arab Emirates. Sea Opera’s master was to manipulate the vessel’s AIS and long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) signal to conceal the visit to Iran and the STS transfer.

“Kindly instruct master of Sea Opera after completion of bunkering and formalities accomplished to sail out the vessel from KFK [Khor Fakkan] anchorage as fast as possible and no need to stay at SHJ OPL [Sharjah outer-port limit] drifting, only switch off vessel’s AIS & LRIT to simulator and then proceed at max speed to ASL [Assaluyeh, Iran] and tender NOR [notice of readiness] for loading cargo as nominated,” A PGPICC employee wrote to Sea Opera’s owner Triliance on April 11.

Sea Opera arrived at Assaluyeh on April 13, according to the emails. The PGPICC employee wrote again to Triliance the following day, stating that he was waiting on its “final measures/action taken” on “vessel location adjustment and tracking through simulator” to show Sea Opera ostensibly loading in Iraq’s Khor Al Zubair port.

“Considering above and that, the simulator will be adjusted to show vessel tracking off KAZ [Khor Al Zubair], therefore, please instruct master of Sea Opera after completion of loading and all formalities accomplished to sail out the vessel from ASL and proceed to Sharjah OPL,” the email read.

Complications arose

However, some complications arose. Triliance responded on April 15, stating that the vessel was inspected on April 11 while bunkering at Khor Fakkan, before heading to Assaluyeh, and was instructed to rectify several defects before “any operation”.

“Therefore, we cannot show vessel’s changing place and show him [Sea Opera] in KAZ,” an account associated with Triliance wrote, citing risk of class cancellation.

The parties then decided to simulate the loading to appear in Sohar, Oman, potentially because of its proximity to Khor Fakkan.

“According to our top Manager instruction, please go ahead with arranging Sea Opera AIS simulator to show Sohar as load port and the agent as well as the Owners of daughter vessel P67 been informed & their approvals obtained on this operation condition,” the PGPICC official wrote.

“Kindly request Master of vessel to facilitate us with arrival/departure timings for purpose of Sohar PC according to adjustment of simulator at Sohar.”

Lloyd’s List Intelligence vessel-tracking data shows an extended period of AIS manipulations in April 2023 by Sea Opera, consistent with the emails.

AIS data shows the VLGC sailing on April 11 to a spot about halfway between Khor Fakkan and Kuh Mobarak, Iran, where its AIS becomes impossibly still — an indication of AIS manipulation. The signal remains there until April 15, when it starts sailing south and again becomes extremely still off Sohar, before returning to the same midway spot as before on April 17. An AIS gap is then opened until April 20 at about 1800 hrs UTC, several hours after the emails show Sea Opera left Sharjah following the conclusion of the STS transfer. Satellite imagery from April 14 and 16 further indicates Sea Opera was manipulating its AIS.

Pawan Putra berthed at Port Khalid on April 18, and while Sea Opera’s AIS was off at the time, surveyor documents, and noon reports from the vessel’s master verify the STS took place in Port Khalid, beginning on April 18 and ending two days later.

A Triliance employee later bemoaned the risk the company took when undertaking the STS operation at the port, stating in an email to the PGPICC that their company, “accepted to discharge cargo via double banking which put on the huge risk”.

Emails requesting comments from two Triliance-associated addresses that appeared in the leaks were not deliverable, suggesting the accounts were shut after they were exposed.

Lloyd’s List could not find contact details for the Hong Kong-based single-ship company that is listed on shipping databases as Sea Opera’s registered owner and shipmanager.

Pawan Putra is ultimately owned by Japan-based Phoenix Company Limited. The company told Lloyd’s List in an email that the vessel “is on bareboat charter and accordingly the vessel’s operations are not conducted by our company”.

“We will refrain from making any comments on our customer due to confidentiality obligations.”

The ship’s manager at the time did not respond to an emailed request for comment.

Forged documents

Like most Iranian cargoes shipped on VLGCs, the LPG on Pawan Putra was delivered to China, arriving at the port of Dongshan in early May 2023. A draft of the cargo manifest showed the LPG originated in Sharjah.

The bills of lading for Sea Opera dated April 17, 2023, show that it loaded 21,330 tonnes of propane and 21,219 tonnes of butane in Sohar, Oman. Additionally, a sail certificate purportedly issued by Omani customs authorities likewise indicates that Sea Opera left the sultanate on April 17, with time of departure cited as 0300 hrs.

However, an ullage report bearing the National Iranian Oil Company letterhead dated April 15 shows the propane and butane were loaded in Assaluyeh. Moreover, even the vessel’s “simulated” AIS signal does not show it calling at Sohar Port.

The certificate of origin for Sea Opera’s “Omani” LPG was issued by Oman-based Babylon Marine Services. Lloyd’s List could not find records of the company in the sultanate’s commercial registration database, or an email or phone number to contact the company.

Lloyd’s List has approached the Royal Oman Police and the Directorate General of Customs for verification of the sail certificate and certificate of origin.