HERE is a contemporaneous maritime security challenge to watch: What happens to Yi Peng 3 (IMO: 9224984), a China-flagged panamax bulk carrier suspected of cutting Baltic cables that has been stopped in the Danish Strait for three days now after being intercepted by the Danish navy.

Why is this of interest? Because under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty of Copenhagen 1857 all ships in that region have the right of innocent passage.

The Danish government has not revealed whether Yi Peng 3 has been detained but confirmed that Ministry of Defence naval vessel Najaden is “staying close”.

Previous media statements on the right of innocent passage made by the Danish Maritime Authority earlier this year (in relation to why sub-standard dark fleet* tankers are not stopped, boarded and detained) referenced they can only interfere in commercial navigation when a ship is not in innocent passage.

Authorities would board a tanker “if the authority receives specific information that the safety or working conditions of the seafarers are not in compliance with international regulations including obligatory insurance requirements”, according to the Danish Maritime Authority.

“This does not occur frequently and requires knowledge of the specific conditions on board, as well as the practical feasibility of transfer to the ship.”

The swift and aggressive response to Yi Peng 3 is insightful and suggests a co-ordinated decision by Nato allies on whether or not the right of innocent passage applies in this case as Sweden, Finland and Denmark investigated the cable-cutting, amid suspected sabotage by Russia.

Yi Peng 3 is suspected of having sailed over two severed data cables at the same time they were cut, the Wall Street Journal reported.

What happens next has potential application for dark fleet transits of Baltic-loaded Russian oil through the Danish Strait and the English Channel.

The UK government announced last month that it would begin asking this elderly, anonymously owned sanctions-skirting fleet of poorly maintained tankers for evidence of marine insurance when transiting the English Channel as a way of dealing with the safety, security and environmental risks they pose.

This approach is untested and questions have been raised about its effectiveness.

Unclos has many critics that argue the convention is no longer fit for purpose. 

Yet Yi Peng 3 might illuminate the way that Western governments can deal with jurisdictional and other maritime legal complexities arising as state actors increasingly use commercial shipping for nefarious ends (witness containerships from North Korea delivering weapons to Russia).

That may yet embolden them to tackle maritime security issues presented by the dark fleet and challenge the right of innocent passage under certain circumstances.

* Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if it is aged 15 years or over, anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery, solely deployed in sanctioned oil trades, and engaged in one or more of the deceptive shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in May 2020. The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled shipping entities such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, or Iran’s National Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.

Download our explainer on the different risk profiles of the dark fleet here  

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