TAIWAN and EU governments have a similar problem right now. They are both deeply concerned about the nefarious activities of shadow fleet ships engaged in grey zone antics that threaten their security and environmental safety. But they are both at a loss as to how to tackle the problem proactively. 

This is not just a question of naval muscle — this gets to the heart of how difficult it is to assign risk to entities shrouded in opaque structures where geopolitical intent and ownership cannot be easily identified.

Taiwan’s coastguard may have caught a China-owned freighter red-handed in the act of cutting a subsea communications cable off its western coast early on Tuesday, but that’s not the same as proving it was act an of Chinese ‘grey zone’ harassment.

Taipei has a blacklist of more than 50 vessels it is currently tracking that it considers to be suspicious and part of a growing shadow fleet. The Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 was on that list. But beyond detaining the vessel and prompting a shrugged denial from China’s foreign ministry who accurately will explain they have no direct link to the vessel, it remains unclear what can be done.

Over in Brussels meanwhile, the European Commission is redirecting almost a billion euros within its budget to boost surveillance of undersea cables as it grapples with a similar threat, albeit from Russia rather than China.

The problem is that the threat is much wider than simply cable damage.

In the EU action plan on cable security, unveiled last week, officials make clear that security must be significantly enhanced, but they also acknowledge that involves tackling the much wider threat posed by Russia’s “shadow fleet”.

Drawing up lists of these vessels which are often old, in bad shape, with obscure ownership and insurance is easy enough and if the governments are struggling, they need only subscribe to Lloyd’s List.

Brussels knows only too well that this fleet of ageing vessels represents a serious security risk for the EU, whether they are environmental risks (oil spill pollution) or risks for the critical infrastructures (cables cuts) or energy supply security risks, making it a broader geopolitical threat.

Coordinating a response at a national level and via the acronym soup of Frontex, EMSA, ENISA and the various fishing agencies you have never heard of — that is trickier. It is a challenge that cuts through mandates and covers energy, cyber, infrastructures, maritime safety and transport, environmental protection and likely half a dozen security portfolios going all the way up to Nato.

Even if that bureaucratic machine can be coordinated effectively, identifying the risk is still the relatively easy part. Knowing how to secure a maritime domain facing such a broad array of threats — that is much bigger question that neither Taiwan nor the EU appear to have answered yet.

Richard Meade
Editor-in-chief, Lloyd’s List

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