New guidelines on car carrier fire response from industry experts
- Vehicle Carrier Safety Forum updates best practices report
- Move comes after IMO subcommittee publishes action plan
- Up to 70 cars lost in blaze on ro-ro in Zeebrugge last week
High-profile casualties include Höegh Xiamen, Felicity Ace, Grande Costa d’Avorio and Fremantle Highway
SHIPPING and marine insurance experts have published updated guidelines on car carrier fire response, with the issue back in the headlines after dozens of cars were destroyed in a blaze on a ro-ro vessel last week.
The Vehicle Carrier Safety Forum document comes after a number of substantial fires on the vessel type in recent years.
High-profile incidents include Höegh Xiamen (IMO: 9431848) in 2020, Felicity Ace (IMO: 9293911), Grande Costa d’Avorio (IMO: 9465382) and Fremantle Highway (IMO: 9667344) in 2023.
The latest casualty occurred on April 16, involving Delphine (IMO: 9789245), the world’s largest shortsea ro-ro.
Delphine, which was laden with 260 EV and internal combustion engine cars, was alongside at the Belgian port of Zeebrugge when fire broke out on the third deck.
According to media reports, the master remained on board to monitor the situation while 26 other seafarers were evacuated.
The fire required the attendance of four firefighting tugboats, and was brought under control after the compartment was sealed off and the CO2 gaseous suppression system was activated.
Firefighting work continued throughout the night, with temperatures reaching 100°C, but between 60-70 cars had to be written off.
The dangers of fires on car carriers have been acknowledged by the ship systems and equipment sub-committee of the International Maritime Organization, which in February launched an action plan to enhance fire safety measures.
The measures proposed include improved fire detection, prevention, and extinguishing systems.
There has been extensive speculation about the culpability of li-ion batteries on electric vehicles, which are known to be liable to spontaneous combustion.
Particular attention has focused on thermal runaway, which is caused when high temperatures create a chemical reaction within a lithium-ion cell, resulting in an uncontrollable self-heating state.
But so far, only one incident has officially been attributed to the carriage of EVs.
Martin Carlsson, project manager, fire safety at Stena Teknik, pointed out in comments to Lloyd’s List two year ago: “It is far more easy to set fire to a liquid fuel, compared with a battery. This contradicts the general understanding, but a fossil fuel car is actually more vulnerable to fire.”
The Vehicle Carrier Safety Forum was established by car carrier operators in 2020 and is backed by the International Chamber of Shipping and the International Group of P&I Clubs.
Its latest report, titled Fire Response — High Level Guidelines is available to download on the International Group website.
The guidelines do not set down detailed procedures on fire response, arguing that there are too many variables in design, equipment, and trade for that to be realistic. Instead, they provide a framework to inform their own analysis.
They also do not include use of emerging technical solutions, recognising that response is limited by vessel design, current crew training regimes and equipment available onboard.
The focus is on early suppression of fires using fixed firefighting systems.
Whether or not fires originate from li-ion batteries, early-stage fires involving thermal runaway are harder to extinguish than an internal combustion engine fire, although the latter can also be problematic once established.
Both types of fire commonly reach peak heat release rate in six to ten minutes from onset. If the initial response does not have the fire under control within 10-15 minutes of the first alarm, then use of fixed firefighting systems is recommended.
Company policy should clearly give masters the authority to deploy FFS if they consider that a pre-agreed trigger event has occurred. Crews should be trained in their use.
Fires in port require a modified response and an appropriate detailed plan should be developed. Consideration should be given to liaising with local fire services in ports that are regularly visited.
Vessel construction, in particular the fire resistance properties of decks and bulkheads, and ramp/door operation points including means, should be factored into such plans.
Operators should ensure that the stowage plan is always kept up to date and contains all essential information, including vehicles’ engine type.
There is a risk that fires which have been brought under control may reignite. Vessel operators should develop policies and procedures to keep tabs on the possibility.
Thermal runaway produces large quantities of vapour that is both toxic and explosive. There may be occasions when it is preferable to vent the vapour, as opposed to the usual practice of suspending ventilation.
The VCSF’s findings are intended to be complementary to the IMO sub-committee initiative and should be used in conjunction with specific procedures from individual vehicle manufacturers, shippers, terminals or carriers in respect of vehicle separation on board the vessel and emergency response.
The industry debate on these issues is certain to continue. Wallenius Wilhelmsen, the world’s largest operator of pure car and truck carriers, has argued publicly that the transport of EVs does not present any greater risk than any other vehicle type.
Nevertheless, the company has introduced restrictions on electric vehicle li-ion battery charging on board its vessels to a maximum of 30%.
The lower state of charge should mean it takes longer for a battery to go into thermal runaway should a fire occur. Previously, such batteries were typically charged at up to 70%.
Other stipulations from Wallenius Wilhelmsen include checking vehicles’ electronic warning systems and clearly indicating EVs on a vessel’s loading plan.
