Tankers collide in Strait of Hormuz
Updated: Navigational errors most likely cause of casualty; unlikely to be linked to the wider regional conflict
Frontline-owned Front Eagle was involved in a collision with dark fleet tanker Adalynn off the UAE coast in the early hours of June 17
TWO crude oil tankers have collided at the eastern entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, just 15 nautical miles off Fujairah, United Arab Emirates.
Frontline-owned, Liberia-flagged, 299,550 dwt VLCC Front Eagle (IMO: 9855343) and Antigua and Barbuda-flagged, 164,551 dwt suezmax Adalynn (IMO: 9231767) collided at 0015 hrs on June 17.
Front Eagle, which is managed by Anglo-Eastern, was fully laden at the time of the collision and bound for the Chinese port of Zhoushan, while Adalynn, which appears on the Lloyd’s List dark fleet* list, had just departed the anchorage in ballast condition.
Frontline said in a statement that all crew from Front Eagle had been reported safe with no injuries recorded. A fire on the tanker’s deck was quickly extinguished.
The UAE’s National Guard confirmed it evacuated Adalynn’s 24 crew members using search and rescue boats and transferred them to the port of Khor Fakkan.
Frontline said it was aware of a fire on board Adalynn following the collision, while a Lloyd’s List Intelligence casualty report suggested the tanker had suffered structural damage as a result of the impact.
“A full investigation will be carried out to determine the cause of the maritime incident. This is a navigational incident and not related to the current regional conflict,” Frontline said in a statement.
Only yesterday, UKMTO warned vessels of increased GNSS interference in the region as Iran and Israel continue to trade fire.
Front Eagle experienced some interference to its Automatic Identification System on June 15, more than 24 hours before the incident with Adalynn.
Lloyd’s List Intelligence ship-tracking manager Richard Smale, who previously served as a deck officer with Maersk Line and as a shipmanager for CMA CGM, said this incident was most likely down to navigational error, rather than GNSS interference.
According to Smale, Front Eagle, travelling south at approximately 12 knots, entered a developing close-quarters situation with the Adalynn, which was making around five knots.
In such cases, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea provide well-established rules for the safe interaction of vessels, covering overtaking, crossing, and responsibilities of stand-on and give-way ships. These rules form the foundation of maritime safety. What initially looks like an overtaking situation changed when Adalynn altered course to port, increasing a risk of collision. It is possible that this change went unnoticed by the Front Eagle’s bridge team.
As the risk of collision increased, Front Eagle appears to have taken evasive action. However, Smale noted that the key moment may have been when the vessel altered course to starboard, inadvertently placing itself in the path of Adalynn.
Smale highlighted the complexity of navigation at sea, particularly at night and in congested waters. In such conditions, navigators rely on a combination of technology and human judgement: radar, visual observation, GPS and AIS.
While GNSS jamming remains a concern in the region and has recently intensified due to recent geopolitical escalations, in a close-quarters scenario, visual bearings and radar would normally be the primary navigation tools, with AIS serving as a secondary aid. He also emphasised the difficulties of interpreting a vessel’s aspect at night. A ship's orientation is primarily indicated by its navigation lights, which can make it challenging to determine its true course and speed. This can hinder efforts to predict its next movements accurately.
Although full details will be confirmed by official investigations, Smale’s preliminary conclusion is that this was a navigational incident, not one caused by geopolitical complications.
* Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if it is aged 15 years or over, anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery, solely deployed in sanctioned oil trades, and engaged in one or more of the deceptive shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in May 2020. The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled shipping entities such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, or Iran’s National Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.