AS DANISH prime minister Mette Frederiksen was taking over the rotating EU presidency on Tuesday, vowing to make security her top priority, a fraudulently flagged tanker loaded with Russian crude was heading towards Danish waters.

The now routine voyage of the sanctioned tanker Sierra (IMO: 9522324), currently flying the entirely fictitious Malawi flag, illustrates the scope of the security problem that Frederiksen, and the rest of the Baltic states now face.

Since April at least five falsely flagged or entirely unflagged tankers have sailed in and out of the Baltic.

While many of these tankers are spoofing their AIS position, they are always under the forensic attention of Baltic state navies and coastguards who are left to monitor, but not intercept, these shipments while the politicians try to find a way to tighten enforcement options.

Sierra, which loaded its fifth cargo of Russian crude at Ust-Luga late last week, signalled a change of registration from Sao Tome and Principe to Malawi in June as it was headed to Russia on its latest voyage. It was the third change of flag for the tanker this year.

The government of Malawi has confirmed that a newly established ship registry, which has flagged at least four sanctioned tankers in recent weeks, is a fraudulent operation.

“We want something with our presidency,” Frederiksen said in an interview with the Politiken daily published on Sunday. “Security is clearly defined as the top priority. I think we should introduce tougher sanctions against Russia.”

This applied to the “shadow fleet”*, she said in a separate television interview last week.

But Fredriksen and the rest of the Baltic State leaders are struggling to win EU consensus on a tightened approach to Russian tanker sanctions and, inside the International Maritime Organization, the mechanisms they want for tighter checks are not coming quickly.

Hungary and Slovakia are continuing to hold up progress on the EU’s 18th package of new Russia sanctions, largely on the basis that they want to see a separate proposal to ban Russian gas dropped first.

Inside the IMO, proposed amendments to existing mandatory ship reporting systems did finally get through multiple votes after strong opposition from Russia, China, North Korea and the International Chamber of Shipping.

The ICS had made the argument that existing provisions within UN Convention on the Law of the Sea allows such vessels to be challenged, but amending existing reporting requirements to address the politicised shadow fleet issue risks further destabilising the rules based order that shipping of all flags rely on.

The long-term consequences of the move, however, was over-ridden and the vote was, eventually, won amid a hotly divided IMO session. But the finalised drafts of those changes are not scheduled to be adopted until May 2026, with implementation to follow six months later.

Assuming those changes go through, however, it remains unclear whether falsely flagged ships will comply with requests to reveal key details regarding insurance and certification. It also remains a matter of speculation how far the Baltic states will go to enforce the bureaucratic amendments when facing the threat of Russian naval escorts or fighter jets being scrambled in response.

These are not hypothetical scenarios. On May 13 Russia deployed a fighter jet into Nato airspace after the Estonian Navy started to escort a similarly falsely flagged tanker from its waters that was heading to the Russian port of Primorsk. The move effectively signalled to the Baltic states that Russia was ready to use force to defend so-called shadow fleet tankers, regardless of the flag or ownership details of the vessel.

Last month, Russian warship Boikiy disguised itself using a fake AIS signal while travelling through the English Channel. It was escorting two sanctioned oil tankers.

While the pattern of evasion that sees shadow fleet or falsely flagged tankers switch registration, spoof AIS signals and engage old MMSI numbers mid-voyage is now well established, every voyage is being carefully tracked via Nato national naval surveillance.

The problem is that beyond asking vessels for documentation, which Lloyd’s List understand Finland is now routinely doing, when the tankers refuse to comply with the request there is no longer an available move that will not risk escalation.

On June 20, Denmark joined the rest of the so-called Baltic 8++ states to issue a notice of joint action aimed at further countering Russia’s shadow fleet.

The communique promised joint coordinated action to effectively address Russian attempts to circumvent international sanctions. It also specifically called out falsely flagged vessels as a major concern.

“Stateless vessels, including those falsely claiming to fly a flag, do not have a responsible flag state and are not entitled to rights under Unclos, including freedom of navigation,” it explained.

“If vessels fail to fly a valid flag in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, we will take appropriate action within international law,” stated the communique, which was issued in advance of the recent Nato summit where the topic was scheduled for discussion.

That discussion, however, got sidelined by US demands to increase defence budgets and the Israel-Iran conflict.

Since then, all industry channels have gone silent on the issue and none of the Baltic states have risked approaching any of the falsely flagged ships sailing past their naval surveillance operations.