THE NEW EU sanctions targeting Russia could have both negative and positive effects on mainstream tanker rates, depending on the segment, and even if the Trump administration doesn’t sign on, the latest measures could crimp Russia’s oil revenues.

Analysts at Vortexa broke down the three main aspects of the new sanctions package during a presentation on Tuesday.

The first aspect — more vessels on EU and UK sanctions lists — is expected to be a relative non-event for tanker markets.

The other two components — the floating price cap and the eventual ban on EU imports of products derived from Russian crude — are much more significant.

Vessels added to sanctions list

Of the 105 vessels added to the EU sanctions list, “some are getting sanctions for the first time ever”, said Vortexa senior freight analyst Mary Melton.

“But in terms of what this will mean for vessel behaviour, it’s probably not going to be much of a change, because when vessels are sanctioned only by the EU or the UK, and not the US, they still manage to have employment and call in India.”

All of the vessels newly sanctioned by the UK had previously been sanctioned by the US or EU, she added.

Vortexa data shows that around 70% of employment of the newly sanctioned vessels are in the Far East trade, mostly carrying Russian ESPO crude from Kozmino to Northern China. As a result, Melton said, “there’s not much of an impact in terms of what’s happening with Russian Urals volume” out of the Baltic and Black Sea.

Sanctions on vessels in Russia’s Far East did have an impact on tanker markets in January-February. However, that was because of US sanctions.

“It’s the sanctions from Ofac [the US Office of Foreign Assets Control] that neutralise vessels from further employment,” said Melton. With EU and UK sanctions, “fleet dynamics and Russian oil logistics are not likely to change significantly”.

The floating price cap

The new EU floating price cap is a different story, and has the potential to affect non-Russian freight markets as well as Russian crude pricing and volumes.

Russian crude exports have continued at a relatively steady pace this year, with China, India and Türkiye continuing to be the primary buyers.

According to Vortexa data, Russian crude exports averaged 4.8m barrels per day in 1H25, down 3% year on year but roughly in line with the monthly average since the G7 price cap of $60 per barrel was instituted in December 2022.

Russian Urals crude has traded below $60 per barrel for most of 1H25, which has led to an influx of Greek tanker operators into the trade — which, in turn, raises the possibility that the new floating price cap will have a material effect on deployments.

Melton noted that Greek operators have been “essential to the Russian Urals trade over recent months”.

Vortexa data shows that over 40% of Russian Urals volume was carried by Greek tankers in June, “which is the second-highest level we’ve observed since the price cap came into effect”, she said. The highest level was in June 2023, at over 50%. This month, the Greek share is at 38%.

The recent surge of Greek owner involvement has been so significant that it has curtailed freight rates for Russian cargoes, according to data from price-reporting agency Argus. Russian Urals freight in June was down almost 20% versus March.

The new floating EU price cap, which has been approved by the UK, has been initially set at $47.60 per barrel, and adjusts every six months to 15% below the average Urals price in the previous six months. There is a wind down period for existing contracts that expires on October 20.

“If the Greek operators leave the Russian trade when the wind down ends in October, Russia is going to have very significant logistical issues in terms of keeping up Urals volumes,” predicted Melton.

She added, “If Greek operators do move out of the Russian trade, then there is going to be quite a lot of supply pressure on mainstream markets, which is something for the wider market to think about.”

Russia would have two options, she continued: It could price Urals “at a very significant discount in order to keep European operators involved” or it could find more shadow tankers*.

The latter option “is getting more and more difficult, because the vessels that are currently not sanctioned and are willing to take the risk are doing other things, like being in the Russian Far East or facilitating STS [ship-to-ship transfers] offshore off Singapore for other sanctioned trades.

“It’s not going to be easy for that many vessels to be replaced when you see how vital Greek operators have been, especially in recent months.”

The initial price cap was spearheaded by the US as a “relief valve” to prevent EU sanctions from limiting global supply and causing oil prices to spike amid the period when the EU was transitioning away from Russian imports. The US concern at that time was that limitations on shipowner access to UK P&I clubs and European shipping and finance services could work too well.

The question ahead is whether the new, much lower EU price cap could have the impact that the US initially feared.

Even if the US sticks to its original cap, and there is a schism in G7 policy, that would not protect Greek operators that need access to UK P&I and European shipping services.

One consequence of lower Russian exports via aframaxes and suezmaxes is frequently cited by executives of publicly-listed tanker owners: It would theoretically compel more crude exports from the Middle East to China and India using very large crude carriers, a positive for mainstream VLCC demand.

EU import ban of products derived from Russian crude

Another aspect of the new EU sanctions package that promises broader tanker impacts is the probation of EU imports of clean products derived from Russia crude, beginning on January 21, 2026.

“To do that, they are going to require certificates of origin for any products coming into the EU that would basically have to prove the crude oil is not Russian, and there are a lot of questions on how this will actually be enforced, just because of the complexity of enforcing something like that,” said Melton.

According to Anna Zhminko, energy markets analyst at Vortexa, European middle-distillate imports from India and Türkiye have averaged around 360,000 bpd this year.

India and Türkiye “have historically been major importers of Russian crude since the invasion of Ukraine, and mostly these are sanctioned crude grades”.

Europe’s combined middle-distillate imports from India and Türkiye account for about 25% of its total imports, implying a significant impact from the new rule, depending on how it is enforced.

Other major suppliers of products to Europe are the Middle East and the US Gulf.

“When the time comes and should this regulation actually be enforced in January, there is potential for those regions to step in and balance out the imports that would otherwise come from Türkiye and India to Europe,” said Zhminko.

That should have a positive effect on product tanker tonne-miles. The voyage distance between Houston and Rotterdam is 58% times greater than the distance to Rotterdam from Izmit, Türkiye, although it is 20% shorter than from Mumbai, India.

The distance between Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, and Rotterdam is double the distance from Izmit and roughly equal to the distance from Mumbai.

* Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as being part of the Shadow Fleet if it engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices indicating that it is involved in the facilitation of sanctioned oil cargoes from Iran, Russia or Venezuela. Or it is sanctioned for participation in sanctioned oil trades or is sanctioned for links to a company that is sanctioned for facilitating the export of sanctioned oil.