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US sanctions target Houthi maritime network

  • Ofac targets tankers revealed by Lloyd’s List investigation to be involved in oil transfers to UN purchased storage facility
  • Largest round of sanctions targeting Yemen’s Houthis hits 32 entities and four tankers
  • Networks of front companies and illicit shipping facilitators identified in China, UAE and Marshall Islands

A fresh round of US sanctions targeting Yemen’s Houthis has gone after the maritime networks behind the Iran-backed militant group, including tankers involved in transfer of oil to a UN-purchased tanker

THE US Treasury has unveiled its largest sanctions action to date targeting the Iran-backed Houthi network in Yemen, designating networks of front companies and illicit shipping facilitators outside of Yemen used to manage their maritime operations.

The sanctions also specifically target two of the tankers identified by Lloyd’s List in July as having been involved in ship-to-ship transfers of cargoes on to the VLCC Yemen (IMO: 9323948), purchased by the United Nations and used by the Houthis as a floating storage facility. 

The networks targeted are part of the Houthis’ global illicit fundraising, smuggling, and weapons procurement operations, according to the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

The 32 designations include Houthi-associated companies, their owners, and other key Houthi operatives located in Yemen, China, the United Arab Emirates and the Marshall Islands.

Among the designated entities are several shipping companies that have played critical roles in the Houthis’ operations, including United Arab Emirates-based Tyba Ship Management DMCC.

Tyba is owned by Muhammad al-Sunaydar, a Houthi-linked businessman previously designated by the US Treasury in July, who coordinated portions of the management and accounting of Tyba’s vessels with Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC, another Houthi-affiliated entity also sanctioned in July.

Tyba operates the Antigua & Barbuda-flagged tankers Star MM (IMO: 9186625) and Nobel M (IMO: 9228784), which discharged oil for Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC at Houthi-controlled port Ras Isa in late May 2025. Tyba also operates the Panama-flagged tanker Black Rock (IMO: 9196448) and Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Shria (IMO: 9179347).

The treasury designation of the Tyba vessels does not specify specific shipments that were analysed as part of the sanctions rationale, however, both Star MM and Shria, were known to be involved in illicit ship-to-ship transfers uncovered by a Lloyd’s List investigation.

At least three separate ship-to-ship transfers of cargoes on to the VLCC Yemen have been tracked since it was purchased by the UN in 2023 as part of an operation to salvage the oil on board FSO Safer (IMO: 7376472), a 49-year-old floating storage unit that was in danger of sinking.

Both Yemen and the still floating FSO Safer are now under the effective control of the Houthis.

The shipments have all happened despite repeated objections being made by the UN Development Programme, which retains an advisory oversight role and pays a $450,000 monthly fee for technical services to maintain the vessel.

The treasury designations do not specify whether these shipments were considered as part of the latest sanctions against Tyba and the tankers under its control.

 

 

 

In addition to the maritime networks being hit, Ofac also targeted shipping facilitators accused of transporting military-grade components from commercial suppliers to Houthi forces in Yemen.

The China-based logistics company Guangzhou Yakai International Freight Forwarding has facilitated many shipments of dual-use components and other military-grade materials in support of the Houthis’ weapons development efforts.

Similarly, another China-based Houthi-associated shipping company, Guangzhou Nahari Trading was sanctioned on the basis that it procured dual-use items and other components from China-based suppliers, which it then obscured in shipments destined for Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.

In total, 32 individuals and entities, and four tankers were designated as being part of the Houthis’ global illicit fundraising, smuggling, and weapons procurement operations.

“The Houthis continue to threaten US personnel and assets in the Red Sea, attack our allies in the region, and undermine international maritime security in coordination with the Iranian regime,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K Hurley.

“We will continue applying maximum pressure against those who threaten the security of the United States and the region.”

 

* Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as being part of the Shadow Fleet if it engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices indicating that it is involved in the facilitation of sanctioned oil cargoes from Iran, Russia or Venezuela. Or it is sanctioned for participation in sanctioned oil trades or is sanctioned for links to a company that is sanctioned for facilitating the export of sanctioned oil.

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