RUSSIA has taken over from Iran as the primary supplier of naphtha to Venezuela, data from Vortexa shows.

Until May 2025, the US was still the primary source of naphtha imports for the South American nation, though exports of the product from the US have been banned since 2019 as part of a sanctions campaign levelled against Caracas.

But after the last of the so-called wind-down licences expired, Russia stepped in to fill the void.

In periods where US product has not been available previously, Iran was the exporter of choice for Venezuela, particularly between September 2021 and July 2023.

But as Vortexa director of maritime risk Claire Jungman explained, Iran has redirected much of its naphtha and condensate towards Asia (in particular China), where it can secure steadier demand and higher returns.

“At the same time, Venezuela’s swap arrangements with Iran have faltered amid operational challenges and payment delays,” she told Lloyd’s List.

“That’s left an opening for Russia, which is seeking new outlets for its refined products under Western sanctions.

“Russian suppliers already operate within the same shadow fleet network used for sanctioned crude flows, so sending naphtha cargoes to Venezuela is a natural extension of that trade.

“These shipments are politically aligned, commercially viable, and easier to move within the sanctions-resistant ecosystem both countries rely on.”

Some of those Russian naphtha exports to Venezuela have come via a ship-to-ship transfer.

Lloyd’s List Intelligence data reveals a now common pattern for these voyages.

A vessel loads in a Russian port, typically with its Automatic Identification System turned on.

It then travels to the Strait of Malacca and conducts an STS transfer with another vessel. That vessel then voyages to Venezuela, spoofing its position to discharge.

In one example, a vessel appears as if it is off the Brazilian coast, but several factors show this is not true.

Its AIS moves in a strange circle, with coordinates repeating in an impossible manner while the ship is off the south Brazilian coast. There are similarly unnatural movements while the ship is “sailing” off the coasts of Guyana and Surinam.

But perhaps most tellingly, the AIS station receiving data when the vessel is supposedly off the Brazilian coast is located in Puerto la Cruz, Venezuela.

Bridget Diakun, senior risk and compliance analyst at Lloyd’s List Intelligence, says it is critical that those conducting due diligence checks are aware of these types of deliveries as they are a potential blindspot when conducting vessel reviews.

“Looking at the voyage of the tanker moving cargo out of Russia at a high level, there are no obvious red flags: there is no spoofing, no disabling of AIS data at the time of loading and even during the ship-to-ship transfer.

“That does not mean that this transaction is risk-free, though, and it really highlights the importance of monitoring a delivery from start to finish to make sure your know-your-vessel assessment is accurate and informed decisions can be made.”

* Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as being part of the Shadow Fleet if it engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices indicating that it is involved in the facilitation of sanctioned oil cargoes from Iran, Russia or Venezuela. Or it is sanctioned for participation in sanctioned oil trades or is sanctioned for links to a company that is sanctioned for facilitating the export of sanctioned oil.