IN OCTOBER, members of the International Maritime Organization shocked the world by delaying by one year the adoption of one of the biggest global climate policy breakthroughs in recent years: the IMO Net-Zero Framework (NZF).

The NZF is historic because it is set to be the world’s first meaningful global carbon price on any industry polluter. This rather complex mechanism consists of gradually increasing carbon intensity targets (a technical element) and penalty fees for non-compliance with these targets (an economic element). Crucially, as an amendment of Annex VI of the existing Marpol Convention, it will be legally binding for all international ships over 5,000 gt.

The NZF is the single most important tool the IMO has to achieve its 2023 Revised Strategy goals, which countries agreed requires both economic and technical measures. It would also generate real action and substantial finance, which three decades of COP meetings have failed to deliver.

While the NZF adoption in October was expected to be a formality, since a clear majority of countries agreed to the text at MEPC83 in April, this all collapsed within a week of negotiations under relentless pressure from the opposition. This was namely delaying tactics by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and reported threats by the US to IMO member states, especially to the most vulnerable countries in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Pacific.

Many oil producer countries strongly oppose the NZF since they sell around 300m tonnes of fuel to the shipping industry every year. Whether crude oil serves as a feedstock for energy, plastics, or petrochemical applications, it will produce heavy fuel oil as a toxic byproduct of refineries. If ships stop using this sludge for propulsion, refineries would have to dispose of it at a cost, rather than sell it for profit.

Crucially, however, the opponents to the NZF failed to achieve their ultimate goal: to garner enough support among countries to reject the agreement in its entirety. Instead, they proposed and won a vote to adjourn the decision by one year (out of 127 countries at the meeting, 57 voted for a delay, 49 voted against, and 21 abstained).

Despite these pressures, a strong coalition of countries, including Pacific Islands, Brazil, Chile, Namibia, Mexico, Seychelles, DR Congo, the UK, Mexico, Canada, and the European Union remain committed to adopting the NZF as soon as possible.

What happens in the next 12 months lies solely in the hands of the IMO members, and here are five options of how it could play out.

Five possible scenarios for 2026

First, the best possible outcome for the NZF is its survival through a majority vote to adopt next year. On top of being adopted, survival also requires using a “tacit” acceptance procedure. This means that the NZF enters into force automatically, unless 1/3 of MARPOL Annex VI parties or countries that account for 50% of tonnage explicitly oppose. This has been common practice for the IMO’s decision-making since the 1970s.

The second option is to keep the NZF in its current state: in a coma. This would require a majority vote to again adjourn the discussions when they resume. It’s a straightforward and likely scenario that would keep the NZF in the running, but not implemented. However, though, with every further delay, the chance of it ever being adopted shrinks. Meanwhile, fragmentation of action for shipping decarbonisation will continue to spread, notably beyond the EU Emissions Trading System, creating a patchwork of measures for the shipping industry to comply with.

The third option is the death of the NZF, through a majority vote against adoption among MARPOL Annex VI parties, which is the outcome the opposition camp was not able to find a majority for in October. However, only a handful of states with little interest in climate action would want to go on the record for having killed the NZF, making this outcome unlikely. Though the NZF’s death would create clarity and momentum to start drafting a new measure.

The most disastrous option: the NZF could turn into a zombie. This fourth scenario would require a majority vote in favour of adopting the NZF through the uncommon “explicit” acceptance procedure. Explicit procedure means that the NZF would enter into force only if a set threshold of countries (⅔ MARPOL Annex VI parties and flag states representing 50% of global tonnage) explicitly declare their acceptance to the IMO. The NZF would be alive (because “adopted”) but dead (because it would face the high risk of never being “accepted”, which is required for it to enter into force). Such an “empty shell” outcome is a more elegant option for opponents who want to quietly kill the NZF, since countries would need time and political commitment to go through national procedures, this option would make entry into force altogether unlikely.

Finally, the fifth version of the NZF is a mutant that re-opens political discussion. This would lead to delays that undermine the phase out of fossil fuels and would make a just and equitable transition even more challenging, which is a red line for many least developed countries and small island developing states. Moreover, any substantive changes would trigger a new vote on “agreement”, followed by a vote on “adoption” six months later.

What will it take?

The IMO as an organisation is caught in a double bind. On the one hand, it needs to ensure institutional survival in an increasingly challenging geopolitical context. On the other hand, it needs to deliver on its commitments on climate action — including the 2023 GHG Strategy, which its members unanimously adopted. The role of the IMO’s secretary-general and the MEPC chair will be more critical than ever in 2026.

A zombie NZF would also undermine the IMO's well-functioning mechanism of tacit acceptance. Changing the adoption process to explicit also sets a dangerous precedent for any future policies, not only climate regulations, to be adopted “explicitly”, weakening the IMO as a global regulator.

A mutant NZF would kneecap the green transition for shipping, both in terms of phasing out fossil fuels and delivering it in a just and equitable manner.

Neither death, coma, zombie nor mutant could be seen as a success for climate change.

The the only credible way forward is to get the NZF adopted in 2026. It’s difficult but possible.

It will require strong unity of IMO members committed to climate action, further clarity on the guidelines and implementation of the NZF and its fund, as well as procedural fairness (which was missing on so many levels throughout the negotiations) both inside and outside the IMO building.

While too many politicians falter in and forsake their climate responsibility, the world needs urgent climate action. Delivering this requires unwavering commitment, by everyone at the IMO. The NZF is a hard-fought compromise that deserves survival so it can be strengthened as soon as possible.

Christiaan De Beukelaer is a senior lecturer in culture and climate at the University of Melbourne