01 / Jamieson Greer, US Trade Representative

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has been at the very heart of the US policy maelstrom that rocked global shipping in 2025.

USTR policies on port fees have forced widespread vessel deployments, and tariffs based on USTR investigations have caused global shifts in cargo flows. Some shipowners have profited; others have lost.

The shipping industry was forced into Herculean efforts on contingency planning, only to see the port fees paused for a year on November 10 as part of the US-China trade agreement.

Countless ships were rerouted, vessels were refinanced to remove Chinese sale-leaseback exposure, time and money was spent on rebuttals to USTR proposals, and it all ended up being a bargaining chip in a much bigger game.

02 / Li Chenggang, China International Trade Representative

China, for whom Li Chenggang is the International Trade Representative, responded to the US port fee plan with tit-for-tat fees for ships linked to the US, calling them “necessary acts of passive defence”.

Its measures largely mirrored those of the US, even down to the lack of clarity about how “ownership” and “vessel operator” were defined.

There was consternation over how China would calculate the 25% US ownership threshold — but fees on all US-listed fleets would be far-reaching.

Fearnley Securities estimated the extra costs per call at $6m for a very large crude carrier, $5m for a capesize and $20 per tonne for a liquefied petroleum gas cargo.

03 / Marco Rubio, US State Secretary

Donald Trump’s White House and the departments of State and Energy were absent from the April meeting that approved the International Maritime Organization’s landmark Net-Zero Framework.

They more than made up for it next time round. State secretary Marco Rubio, energy secretary Chris Wright and transportation secretary Sean Duffy came out swinging against the NZF, and the economic threat it presented to the US (or more likely the relatively cheap political win it represented against UN agencies with green ambitions for industry) over the next six months.

What followed was an overwhelming show of diplomatic force to kill the NZF, including bullying, threats and intimidation against delegates from countries much weaker than the US. Rubio contacted several nations personally to promise retaliation if countries voted ‘Yes’.

The US and Saudi Arabia eventually won a one-year delay, which many think is the end of the IMO work plan — and thus the end of the industry hope of global carbon pricing.

04 / Mohammad Ayoub, Saudi Arabia (UNFCCC delegate)

While the headline-grabbing threats by the US were seen as the major blocker of the NZF, Saudi Arabia has long been the leader of the IMO bloc most opposed to green regulations.

The US and Saudi call to adopt the NZF under the old system of “explicit acceptance” — to ensure it never enters into force, even if it passes — was a deft procedural attack, throwing the EU and other delegates off guard and threatening to undermine the functioning of the IMO itself.

Saudi Arabia’s UNFCCC delegate, Mohammad Ayoub, was brought in for this year’s two MEPCs to do what he does best: oppose, oppose, oppose.

Saudi Arabia also submitted several detailed documents listing the various reasons for countries to reject the green scheme they had approved just six months earlier, citing studies to argue carbon taxes would raise food prices for poor countries.

05 / Arsenio Dominguez, International Maritime Organization

Keeping October’s extraordinary MEPC meeting (there’s no better word for it) from going off the rails was arguably the biggest challenge an IMO secretary-general has yet faced.

Arsenio Dominguez narrowly avoided presiding over a rejection of the NZF, or a total collapse of the talks. He told delegates not to celebrate the outcome, but to “come back fresh in one year ready to negotiate”.

Dominguez made it his trademark never to answer when journalists asked what would happen should the NZF not be adopted. His job could well depend on whether it goes through next year.

06 / Sveinung Oftedal, chair, IMO ISWG-GHG (Norway delegate)

Norway’s IMO delegate Sveinung Oftedal chairs the IMO’s intersessional working group on greenhouse gases, ISWG-GHG. It is that forum, not the main chamber, where the real horse trading on carbon pricing usually takes place (perhaps because it’s closed to journalists).

Oftedal has sought gradually to build consensus on a plan that worked. He was instrumental in forming what became the NZF, which passed by a majority vote in April. That majority included Brazil and China, which had been significant critics.

Pacific Islands pushing for a flat carbon levy complained that their plan was sidelined, while the EU27 reckoned that such a levy would never fly. Oftedal got a global carbon price closer than anyone else has — no small achievement.

07 / Maria Angelicoussis, Angelicoussis Group

Greek shipowners have made no secret of their scepticism of carbon pricing. But the intervention in September by a group of six big players, led by Maria Angelicoussis, was important.

The support of the group, which has made big investments in liquefied natural gas fuel, was enough to sway the governments of Greece and Cyprus to abstain from the vote to postpone the framework, breaking with the rest of the EU27.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has since called for Europe to rethink its green agenda more broadly. Let’s see how that plays out now that the EU’s are the only significant emissions rules for shipping in place for the foreseeable future.

08 / General Mamadi Doumbouya, junta leader, Guinea

After nearly 30 years, the $23bn Simandou mine is set to take the tiny African nation of Guinea from nowhere to the world’s third-biggest iron ore exporter.

The biggest mining project on the planet has the potential to reshape the global iron ore trade, giving China the advantage and displacing the dominance of Australia’s Pilbara region, with big ramifications for dry bulk shipping.

General Mamadi Doumbouya, who seized power in Guinea in 2021, is arguably more responsible than any other person for making Simandou happen, forcing mining giant Rio Tinto and its Chinese partners to share the huge costs of developing a railway and port.

09 / Magda Kopczynska, Fotini Ioannidou and Apostolos Tzitzikostas, European Commission

The setback at the IMO makes the European Commission — represented in this list by Magda Kopczynska, Fotini Ioannidou and Apostolos Tzitzikostas — the most significant regulator of shipping’s environment impacts for the foreseeable future.

The ETS and FuelEU Maritime regulations continue to be implemented, and a small industry has sprung up in response on advising companies how to pool and trade compliance surplus to avoid having to pay for biofuels or penalties.

The commission has kept shtum on whether it plans to carry out its threat to extend the schemes to cover 100% of voyages to and from EU ports, from 50% today, if the IMO does not deliver.

But another IMO delay in 2026, or a failure of the NZF altogether, makes such a tax hike far more likely.

10 / Emanuele Grimaldi and Thomas Kazakos, International Chamber of Shipping

The shipowners’ association, the International Chamber of Shipping, continues to be the main voice of the industry in IMO debates. It will have its work cut out for it next year as the role of industry associations diminishes and great-power politics takes over the carbon price debate.

But the ICS — represented in this list by Emanuele Grimaldi and Thomas Kazakos — remains influential in lobbying governments on industry topics including safety and security, alternative fuels and seafarer well-being.

This list is part of the Lloyd’s List One Hundred People 2025 (Edition 16) that will be published from December 8

The Top 10 in regulation ranking is compiled by the Lloyd’s List editorial team and considers people in a position to influence large-scale change in the shipping industry