THE prospect of a shadow fleet tanker causing a major environmental disaster was never a question of if, but when.

This week’s casualty involving Caroline Bezengi (IMO: 9224439) may prove to be a defining moment in the evolution of sanctions, shipping and the shadow fleet. The stateless tanker, carrying 800,000 barrels of Russian crude, is grounded off Oman amid reports that seven cargo tanks have been breached and an oil slick now exceeds 2,000 sq km. Salvors fear the vessel could break apart before they can stabilise it.

What makes this incident significant is not simply the scale of the pollution threat. It is that the response itself appears to have been complicated by the very sanctions architecture that helped create the shadow fleet in the first place.

The emergence of sanctioned Russian insurer AlfaStrakhovanie as the vessel’s provider of cover highlights a growing shift in maritime risk. Roughly a third of tankers transiting the Baltic are now operating with insurance from sanctioned Russian or Russian-affiliated providers rather than the International Group system that traditionally underpins maritime liability claims and pollution response. As Western insurers and service providers exited Russian trades after 2022, parallel institutions emerged to fill the gap.

The problem is that while Russian insurers may be willing to fund claims and salvage operations, sanctions restrictions mean many western companies cannot readily engage with them. In the case of Caroline Bezengi, industry sources say waivers were required before salvage and pollution response providers could mobilise. Every day lost increased the risk posed by worsening monsoon conditions.

This is the contradiction at the heart of today’s shadow fleet. Western governments have intensified efforts to disrupt Russian oil exports through sanctions, vessel seizures and new insurance-reporting requirements. Russia, meanwhile, is responding by bringing more vessels under its own flag, expanding the role of domestic insurers and challenging western-led regulatory initiatives at the International Maritime Organization.

The result is the gradual emergence of a parallel maritime ecosystem that operates outside many of the commercial and regulatory structures that have traditionally managed risk at sea.

For years, shipping has warned that ageing vessels, opaque ownership chains, fraudulent documentation and limited insurance oversight would eventually produce a major casualty. Caroline Bezengi may be the clearest example yet of those fears materialising.

Even if the vessel is ultimately salvaged and the spill contained, the incident exposes a deeper problem. Sanctions have proved highly effective at encouraging the development of alternative shipping, insurance and registration networks. What they have not yet demonstrated is an ability to manage the environmental and safety consequences when those systems fail.

The shadow fleet is no longer simply a sanctions compliance issue. It has become a test of whether the rules-based maritime order can still function when large parts of global shipping operate beyond its reach.

Richard Meade
Editor-in-chief, Lloyd’s List

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