ABU DHABI is emerging as container shipping’s Hormuz shuttle operator, sustaining a limited but persistent flow of boxship traffic through the strait, while most of the liner industry continues to avoid direct exposure to the conflict zone.

Data from the Maritime Intelligence Unit at Lloyd’s List Intelligence shows a recent uptick in containership transits has been driven almost entirely by vessels linked to AD Ports Group feeder operations rather than any meaningful return of mainstream liner services. While crossings have recovered from the lowest points of the crisis, volumes remain a fraction of pre-conflict levels and are concentrated among a small group of repeat operators.

The trend suggests that what began as an emergency effort to maintain Gulf connectivity is evolving into a container equivalent of the shuttle-tanker networks now underpinning Middle East Gulf crude exports.

Since the conflict began, Gulf producers have increasingly relied on shuttle tankers to move crude from terminals inside the Gulf to transfer points beyond the Strait of Hormuz, limiting the need for international buyers to expose their own vessels to one of the world’s most dangerous waterways. A similar, albeit smaller, model is now taking shape in container shipping.

Major liner operators have largely withdrawn from Hormuz, restructuring services around alternative gateways such as Jeddah and Khor Fakkan, while relying on feeder networks and inland transport corridors to reach Gulf markets. Cargo continues to move, but at a price.

Freight rates into the Middle East Gulf remain far above historical norms. This time last year, spot rates on the China-Middle East Gulf trade hovered around $850 per feu on the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index. Today, the same route commands more than $6,000 per loaded 40 ft unit. Service reliability has also deteriorated as cargo moves through increasingly complex routings.

The absence of major carriers remains striking. MIU data shows the last transit by a global liner operator was the 4,437 teu MSC Colombo V (IMO: 8715857), which passed westbound through the Strait of Hormuz on August 8.

In contrast, vessels without ties to Iran still making regular crossings are overwhelmingly linked to Abu Dhabi interests.

Global Feeder Shipping, now 81%-owned by AD Ports Group, alongside AD Ports-controlled Safeen Feeders, has emerged as the backbone of the remaining container traffic through the strait. The number of crossings increased to seven in the week ending September 20, a notable rise from the quietest weeks of the conflict, but still negligible by historical standards.

The vessels recorded making the crossing included the 2,553 teu SSF Leo (IMO: 9363390), the 3,534 teu SSF Dynamic (IMO: 9329631), the 3,534 teu GFS Precious (IMO: 9436434), and sisterships GFS Juno (IMO: 9187875) and GFS Jade (IMO: 9187863), of 2,442 teu and 2,452 teu nominal capacity respectively. The only vessel not linked to AD Ports interests to transit that week, and indeed in September thus far, was the 1,679 teu Muara (IMO: 9216731), operated by Indian owners and itself a regular user of the route.

All are deployed on short-haul regional services linking UAE ports with Pakistan and India’s west coast, extending as far south as Vizhinjam. Their role increasingly resembles that of Gulf shuttle tankers, providing a dedicated logistics bridge between markets, while larger operators continue to keep their distance from the waterway.

Another two AD Ports-linked vessel, the 2,824 teu GFS Prime (IMO: 9311749) and the 1,740 teu GFS Roja (IMO: 9406960), were tracked transiting the strait this week. The crossings, bringing the September transit tally to 13 for September to date, only underline Abu Dhabi’s continued dominance of the remaining container traffic prepared to run the Hormuz gauntlet.

The result is a container network increasingly dependent on a largely state-backed operator willing to assume risks that most commercial carriers continue to avoid.

That strategy bears a striking resemblance to Abu Dhabi’s approach in the tanker sector.

Throughout the conflict, the UAE’s Abu Dhabi National Oil Co alongside other Gulf states have been steadily acquiring older tankers to move crude out of the strait and into ship-to-ship transfer zones off Fujairah and Sohar, allowing buyers to avoid running their own ships through one of the world’s most dangerous waterways. This is despite repeated attacks on vessels, including nearly 20 on Adnoc alone. Those incidents have resulted in one fatality and 20 crew injuries, yet Adnoc vessels continue to operate regular shuttle services through Hormuz as part of the UAE’s effort to maintain crude exports.

The container trade faces nowhere near the same strategic imperative as oil exports, but the underlying logic increasingly appears similar. While AD Ports Group and Adnoc are separate entities, both sit within Abu Dhabi’s broader state-backed economic ecosystem and share close strategic and infrastructure links. In both cases, the emirate appears willing to shoulder a disproportionate share of the operational risk associated with keeping trade moving through the Gulf.

Meanwhile, recent diplomatic activity at the UN General Assembly has revived hopes that a political breakthrough could eventually reopen the waterway. Yet the latest vessel movements suggest commercial confidence remains largely absent. Even after a modest rise in traffic, Hormuz remains effectively closed to mainstream container shipping.

What container traffic still passes through the strait increasingly resembles a state-backed shuttle service, with Abu Dhabi carrying much of the burden while the wider liner industry continues to watch from the side-lines.